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An obvious question (so obvious, in fact, that people rarely pause to formulate it) confronts 
any critical practice of discourse analysis: what specific consequences, in terms of social 
action, is the particular piece of critical discourse analysis (hereafter, CDA) supposed to 
have? 
The question is not usually asked in such a stark form, of course, for three good, but 
also complicating, reasons. Firstly, written works of any kind (and academic writings in 
particular) tend to have complex and diverse effects: of informing, persuading, reinforcing, 
and critiquing, as well as other, more oblique kinds of influence. All of these effects can vary 
for a single work between different reception contexts; so to attempt to count the 
contributions a particular intellectual work makes to a political agenda, or to the public sphere 
at large, is crude and reductive. The second reason is this: that one special strength and 
interest of ‘discourse’ as a concept is its emphasis on how embedded our use of language (or 
visual, or audio-visual, or multi-media representations) is within other interlocking, possibly 
determining, social practices; one corollary is that it isn’t sensible to try to disentangle 
causation specifically by the critical discourse itself from causation by factors in other, 
connected domains of social action.  The third reason concerns the social circumstances of 
the critique itself: the relation between effects which CDA invokes, and those it can plausibly 
anticipate, varies enormously between one set of political circumstances and another; so a 
work’s oppositional worth has to be recognised not to depend principally, or perhaps even at 
all, on demonstrable social benefits.  
Notwithstanding these qualifications, questions about the social engagement of CDA 
persist.  Nor are such questions confined to the defensiveness or antagonism of political 
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opponents.  Indirectly, the ‘outcomes question’ perplexes the terms on which anyone engaged 
in CDA must work, as it does oppositional cultural politics generally. The problem of social 
engagement has been exposed to increased scrutiny as a result of the relative intellectual 
marginalisation of Marxism world-wide in the later 1980s and 1990s; it is also made more 
problematic by conflicts and incompatibilities between respective cultural-theory positions 
dealing with discourse and society in particular (for instance, competing views based on work 
by Habermas, Foucault, Bourdieu, Pecheux, or Bakhtin, or within different strands of 
postmodernism).  
 Other writers with greater experience of (and commitment to) the general project of 
CDA, as opposed to engagement in specific, local struggles in which discourse plays a part, 
have commented on these difficulties; this paper is not intended as a contribution to that 
general debate. Rather, my aim is to outline strategies of social engagement which give 
direction to much (or perhaps most) work in CDA, and to describe how certain problems 
inherent in such strategies present themselves in a project on which I am currently engaged. 
Given the central concern of CDA with modes of address and power relations in discourse, it 
would be extraordinary if questions concerning the precise point-of-view, or relation of 
commentary, between critical discourse and its object of study - or regarding the mix of 
awareness, potential social agency, and motivation it is reasonable to attribute to an implied 
addressee - were not raised about CDA projects themselves (1). At one level, no doubt it may 
be better for such ‘reflexive’ questions simply to be answered and to move on to substantive 
problems. At risk of interruption and gross simplification, however, in this paper I offer a 
freeze-frame on some of the issues as I understand them.  
 
Language, society and power  
 
Stated baldly, in terms which draw freely on published accounts, the principal force of CDA 
lies in a cluster of related insights, including at least the following. Language plays an 
important role in social reproduction, but is at the same time contested within the overall 
social order. Because of its unsettled but influential position in these respects, language can 
be usefully investigated in terms of its relations to power and ideology ( Foucault, 1972; 
Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew, 1979; Fairclough, 1989). Power in such a context is not 
confined to the exercise of force or rule of law, but involves asymmetries between 
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participants in discourse events, or alternatively a more general, unequal capacity to control 
how texts are produced, distributed, and consumed (Fairclough 1995; Wodak, 1996). 
Although underpinned at the level of the political economy of communications, much of the 
power invested in and circulating through discourse functions by consent. 
CDA engages with the social operation of language by showing how language is not 
an invisible window on the world, but a material practice; to do this, it draws on an 
established tradition of what are widely considered materialist accounts of language (eg. 
Volosinov, 1973; Coward & Ellis, 1977; Bakhtin 1986). In particular, language encodes 
point-of-view, and with it culturally-acquired contextual assumptions which are embedded in 
the texture of discourse at a level where they are no longer self-evident. Such assumptions are 
nevertheless retrieved by interpreters when triggered as presuppositions and different sorts of 
implicature (Levinson 1983; Sperber & Wilson 1986; Grice 1989; Blakemore, 1992; Thomas 
1995); they also shape more general properties of register and genre, because of the different 
amounts of symbolic capital each style of discourse enjoys within the linguistic field 
(Bourdieu, 1991:37-65). Collectively, implied meanings constitute what Michel Pecheux 
(Pecheux , 1982) calls the ‘preconstructed’, or networks of ideological assumptions which 
surface in the meaning of an utterance or text as what Pecheux terms ‘transverse-discourse’ 
effects (mostly, bridging inferences which have to be made by listeners or readers for the sake 
of coherence but which in doing so carry specific, ideological assumptions along with them).  
 The importance of connections between text and social setting is that language is a 
behavioural practice, part of a web of social transactions and interactions through which 
social relations are enacted, reproduced, and challenged. As such, it has a performative 
capability, leading to a range of social outcomes, and also plays a part in the overall formation 
and reproduction of social institutions through which power, including symbolic power, is 
unevenly distributed - and also struggled for - across a given society. While mainstream 
sociolinguistics (eg. Labov, 1972; Hymes, 1974; Hudson, 1980; Romaine, 1994;) investigates 
social variation in the forms and styles of language use, its insights need to be situated within 
the socio-cultural structures of a given political order if they are to be properly understood. 
Only by means of critical, socio-cultural analysis, it is argued in CDA, can the relation 
between sociolinguistic variation and the unequal distribution of power and social access 
within a society be revealed. 
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Historically for CDA, however, links between what we loosely call ‘language and society’ are 
more precise than the word ‘and’ signals. Sedimented in most CDA lies the notion of a more 
precise set of relations - of causation or at least mediation - between economy, ideology and 
the workings of discourse (Hall et al, 1981; MacDonnell, 1986). The broad notion of 
connectedness is well reflected in the published aim of the journal Discourse and Society, to 
‘relate the situational micro-context of verbal interaction, discourse and communication to the 
macro-context of social, political and cultural structures’. For CDA as a social project, it has 
often seemed that it is the precise form of this ‘relation’ between different social levels which 
is politically most at stake.  
In his own work, Norman Fairclough recognises both the difficulties, and his own 
changing positions, on this complex question. In recent work (Fairclough, 1995), he glosses 
the relation in terms of what he calls a ‘three-dimensional’ approach, which he develops 
indirectly, he says, from Bakhtin and Gramsci; that approach links ‘textual description and 
analysis’ to broad relations of ‘sociocultural practice’ by means of an intermediate category of 
‘discourse practice’, which consists of social constraints on discourse such as genre and turn-
taking. The explanatory power of such a model, it is suggested, lies in its layering of an 
investigation of causal relations linking the socio-cultural and discourse practice levels onto 
interpretive work, which extrapolates to the discourse practice level from textual description. 
Loosening the causal directionality given in earlier, superstructural accounts of discourse 
functioning, Fairclough suggests a more complex cycle of influence: social conditions shape 
discourse production and reception; in turn, unevenly and over time, these modify the social 
conditions of discourse production and reception, which then reshape subsequent discourse 
production and reception. Calculated interventions within that cycle may be described as 
discourse struggle (Fairclough, 1995:91-111). 
While Fairclough’s work offers perhaps the most comprehensive and also most 
programmatic characterisation of CDA, it is important to note that there is simultaneously a 
range of other, major alternative frameworks, often developed in complex, hybrid forms. 
Some are far less grounded than Fairclough’s in concepts (adapted from Gramsci and 
Althusser) of the state, ideology, and systems of social control. Eminent among such 
alternatives is the approach, derived ultimately from Habermas (Habermas, 1979), which 
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invokes an ideal of rational communication and challenges ‘disorders of discourse’ which fall 
short of that ideal (cf. Wodak, 1996). Perhaps most widely influential at present are 
approaches drawing on Foucault, concerned with the uneven social dispersal of power 
through (especially technical) discourses at all social levels, constituting subjectivity as well 
as social relations (for wide-ranging discussion, see Mills, 1997). 
 
CDA and social engagement 
 
Given these founding insights and arguments, how does CDA engage in public, critical 
practice? 
Typically, a core claim as to social effect is formulated along ‘emancipatory’ lines, 
such as Fairclough’s ‘helping people struggling against domination and oppression in its 
linguistic forms’ (Fairclough, 1995:1). A gloss on Fairclough’s account is that such help may 
be administered by assisting people presently excluded from particular discourse roles or 
positions to assume those roles, for example when disenfranchised people see how they can 
deconstruct and then reply to messages implicitly critical of them or otherwise functioning to 
their disadvantage. Or help can involve transforming existing discourse styles or conventional 
relations which obtain between interactants in ways which offer clearer or more relevant 
information, or inspire participatory self-confidence, or in some other way give value to 
people’s experience and free up channels for realising individual or group aspirations. 
 As regards public engagement, the overall aim of CDA can be usefully distinguished 
into four further sub-categories. If allowance is made for simplification and artificial 
separation, the four categories are helpful in drawing attention to divergent emphases and 
possibilities. 
 
1.  ‘CDA helps people to handle discourse better’. CDA helps by working with discourse 
practitioners to improve the effectiveness of their professional discourse (both Wodak 
(1996) and Fairclough (1989, 1995), for instance, report work on consultation styles 
with doctors and patients, as well as other projects). 
 
2. ‘CDA engages in specific, discourse-focused struggles’. Such struggles concern the 
circulation of particular representations or kinds of representation; they contest 
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interpretations of texts by means such as media complaints and appeals to tribunals. 
Such work is less about discourse style or competence (as in my first sub-category) 
than about the alleged defamatory, racist, sexist, blasphemous or obscene character of 
particular texts or classes of text. 
 
3. ‘CDA contributes to general discourse awareness and overall cultural literacy’. In this 
capacity, CDA campaigns for changes to the boundaries of tolerance or acceptability 
in a social situation, and seeks to enrich the climate of public debate surrounding 
notions of linguistic correctness and standards (cf. Cameron, 1995). Most of CDA’s 
educational involvement comes under this heading, especially its attempts to enhance 
children’s language and media awareness in the long-range belief that ‘consciousness 
is the first step towards emancipation’ (Fairclough, 1989:1). 
 
4. ‘CDA works to alter recognised forms of what constitutes knowledge’. In doing this, 
CDA lends authority to the specific educational campaigns outlined in my third sub-
category. Such work takes place principally through scholarly and journalistic activity, 
and involves deconstructing value-laden research on language (cf. Fairclough’s 
critique of ‘appropriateness’, Fairclough, 1995:233-52), as well as the interrogation of 
 individual-centred language research by comparison with what is seen as language’s 
fundamental sociality. In this area, CDA aligns itself with related struggles over what 
constitutes knowledge in adjacent fields such as critical literacy studies (Street, 1995), 
or critical legal studies, (Goodrich, 1987). 
 
To avoid any doubt, I should emphasise that I do not believe these snap-shots adequately 
describe the work of particular writers, or identify completely distinct aims for CDA. For 
reasons outlined above aims and outcomes are not simply measurable in this way. The 
headings may nevertheless be helpful in signalling tendencies and relative timescales within 
CDA as regards social intervention, and as a way into considering, below, possible 
difficulties to which aims formulated along the lines indicated can give rise. 
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What is ‘critical’ in critical approaches?  
 
Distinguishing between ‘critical’ and ‘non-critical’ approaches to discourse is not usually a 
problem, thanks in part to the fact that critical discourse analysis often tells you that it is. By 
comparison with  socially dis-engaged (‘uncritical’) forms of discourse analysis - which 
investigate ‘discourse’ using formal, functional, or cognitive categories separate from the 
changing forms of social and institutional life (cf. Sinclair and Coulthard 1975; Brown and 
Yule 1983; Stubbs, 1983; Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; Tannen, 1989, etc) - works of CDA 
share theoretical as well as political preoccupations, even if their ‘critical’ dimension is often 
introduced into discussion less because the legitimacy of a particular interpretation is not 
recognised than because of a less-focused objection to ‘bringing politics into it again’. 
Looked at more closely, however, the term ‘critical’ is almost always problematic. 
One obvious difficulty concerns the precise political content of the criticism. In the cultural 
field, for instance, both Leavis and Pecheux (and for that matter the publications of the 
National Viewers and Listeners Association) are evidently ‘critical’, while being radically 
divergent in what their criticisms presuppose and entail. In terms of intellectual descent, of 
course, ‘critical’ is more properly associated with traditions of critical theory derived from the 
Frankfurt School’s criticism of value-free judgements and positivism in social science, and its 
alternative emphasis on an open-ended, continuously self-critical approach to culture and 
superstructure questions within a broad critique of modern technocratic society. In more 
recent usage, that academic pedigree for ‘critical’ combines with a cluster of interrelated 
structuralist and post-structuralist approaches.  
Outside the academic world, however, in social domains in which CDA needs to build 
support if it is to exert social leverage, the dominant, relevant sense of ‘critical’ remains that 
of adverse or unfavourable judgement. Dictionaries of aphorisms and quotations, and a 
concordance corpus-search, support a view that ‘critical’ is mostly used and perceived 
pejoratively (with senses close to ‘derogatory’, ‘finicky’ ‘fault-finding’ and ‘picky’), and 
often features in disparaging contrast with terms like ‘complimentary’, as well as ‘productive’ 
and ‘innovatory’. Two elements of these common perceptions of ‘critical’ are particularly 
suggestive in pointing towards concerns which can be damaging to CDA’s reputation outside 
academia: first, that ‘critical’ implies oppositional work in the sense of being polemical, 
resistant, antagonistic, or confrontational with respect to whatever is official or mainstream; 
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second, that ‘critical’ means being merely antithetical or reactive, a sort of disgruntled 
commentary after the fact which is unable to offer alternative proposals. (A third sense of 
‘critical’, ‘relating to a crisis or turning-point, and so urgent, pivotal and determining the 
issue overall’, or ‘constituting a point at which some action, property or condition passes 
decisively over into another’ is far less prevalent than ten years ago, and almost certainly 
plays only a residual role in the fantasy-life of critical practice.)  
Building from these two common senses of ‘critical’, and the commonsense challenge 
they pose to CDA, I want now to illustrate particular ways in which such senses bear on 
CDA’s goal of social engagement.  
 
‘Critical’ as ‘oppositional’ 
 
Perhaps the clearest value of CDA lies in its contribution to social change. After all, a 
politicised, teleological claim is implicit: things could be better. Many of the most-cited 
locations of CDA activity reinforce this image, by being organisations formed with the 
purpose of social reform or transformation: trade union branches, environmentalist groups, 
women’s  groups, and tenants’ associations. Others are sites of conflict over social 
reproduction: schools, and professional in-service training (eg. for doctors, police officers, 
social workers, etc). 
The oppositional sense of ‘critical’ is relational, however. ‘Critical’ impetus is located 
not only in values advocated but also in what the CDA is presented as criticism of. There are, 
for instance, important differences between critical analysis of a particular discourse as being 
irrelevant, obfuscatory, or inconsiderate, and criticism of the same discourse as being a 
damaging symptom or ideological manifestation of capitalism. The strategic goal of the 
analysis, and so the sorts of intermediate outcome which might be recognised as furthering 
that goal, derives from either of two main frameworks: a causal claim about relations 
between forms of discourse (as in effect vehicles of ideology) and, through ideology, the 
economic base, such that power is exposed or  revealed in the analysis; or else a political 
claim which informs the analysis but is not necessarily or inevitably linked with the form of 
the discourse itself, deriving instead from a political judgement as to effects of the discourse.  
If forms of discourse become ideological less on account of stylistic properties than by 
being contextualised and used for one political purpose or another depending on the social 
  9 
situation, and on assumptions brought to bear by interpreters, then the key political questions 
about discourse concern social relations which may be contingently reflected in, but are not 
themselves constituted or regulated by, the discourse being analysed. Struggles for power 
undoubtedly still take place;  but what sort of political calculation can sponsor oppositional 
struggle has to be established on new lines and on its own terms (Hirst, 1979). 
What, in  any case, if something does change apparently as a result of CDA 
intervention? Whatever significance can be attributed to the change depends on the overall 
political framework in question: if overthrowing the capitalist order is the primary goal, then 
changes in GPs’ ways of talking to patients at morning surgery may seem a modest 
achievement, even within a continuous larger struggle for hegemony. Within a framework of 
heterogeneous social struggles (about environment, sexual orientation, transport or local 
government, possibly aligned with anti-capitalist forces in a loose alliance of so-called one-
issue groups), such changes may appear far more significant. But that significance has to be 
assessed according to standards of political calculation not specified by the CDA itself.  
This issue is crucial because, problematically in the case of an ‘umbrella’ of local struggles, 
CDA may become simply discourse analysis harnessed to whatever political agenda the 
analyst chooses to bring. One can at least imagine CDA on behalf of anti-vivisection, pro-life, 
libertarian, Sabbatarian, or real-ale causes, for any of which discourse analysis might sharpen 
a rhetoric of rebuttal and the effectiveness of lobbying. A significant feature of the retreat 
from ‘ideological critique’ arguments into more dispersed cultural politics has been that 
serious gaps can open up between knowledge claims and strategy formulation, as in 
Fairclough’s acknowledgement that ‘critical discourse analysis is just one method to be used 
within wider critical projects’ (Fairclough, 1995:??). Political authority for such ‘cultural 
projects’ is conferred somewhere away from the discourse analysis, and without an explained 
theoretical linkage to it.  
Arguably, it is this complication - of critical analysis as persuasion linked either with a 
potential ‘will to power’ inherent in Foucault’s debt to Nietzsche, or with a contrasting 
political pessimism otherwise attributable to Foucault - which makes the writings of Stanley 
Fish so unattractive to CDA.  Fish is hardly ever referred to in CDA, despite his public 
involvement, over a long period, in a series of institutional and political struggles to do with 
language and power (cf. Fish, 1994). But Fish refutes any determinate linkage between 
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discourse and political form; and his maverick view of persuasion as the principal agent both 
of serving and of destabilising any given social or intellectual order drives a wedge between 
discourse analysis and any presumed form of politics.  
 
‘Critical’ as reactive commentary, separate from cultural production  
 
The sense of ‘critical’ as disparaging or antithetical commentary after the fact, cut off from 
active cultural engagement,  depicts CDA as so stuck in rebuttal that it is unable to contribute 
viable alternatives of its own to the continuous circulation of representations in society. To 
counteract such a limitation, CDA is thought to require a shift from criticism into making 
alternative meanings which can be tested against the complexities of social practice (eg. by 
assisting writing, film and video production, multi-media authoring, etc.). 
 This critique of CDA neglects occasional exhortations, such as Fairclough’s, towards  
‘marrying awareness and practice’ (Fairclough, 1989:240); but it would be difficult to argue 
that CDA has placed as much emphasis on combining critique and production as on critical 
analysis itself. One possible explanation for the continuing prioritisation of critique is that 
production is made problematic for CDA by its own analysis of powerful coopting tendencies 
within the contemporary social order. It has been argued, for instance, that in contemporary 
capitalism discourse is widely recognised by a range of dominant organisations as a 
significant agent in socio-cultural reproduction. Symbolically-rich linguistic practices are 
accordingly coopted towards the goal of a sort of social engineering to be achieved by re-
directing existing discourse conventions to new purposes; youth-culture styles especially, as 
well as dialect forms and conversational, even intimate, modes of address are reworked as 
promotional, advertising or other institutionally-directed discourses, with an effect on styles 
ranging from rail announcements and public health warnings to formulaic hamburger sales 
transactions. Following Foucault, Fairclough describes this process as the ‘technologisation 
of discourse’, or appropriation of discourse as an instrument of social regulation which 
subsumes potentially dissenting or counter-cultural discourse-practices in pursuit of its own 
interests (Fairclough, 1995:91-111).  
One consequence of such appropriations of discourse which presents special problems 
for CDA is that insights into how discourse works (and how and why it breaks down) can be 
recuperated as fine-tuning to discourse practices within management, sales, technical 
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instruction or advertising; and CDA is reduced to the status of a kind of textual ergonomics 
serving dominant interests. A risk in devising alternative modes of writing or cultural 
production is accordingly perceived: alternative practices will lose their reflective or critical 
character and be simply coopted into dominant, ‘instrumental’ definitions of discourse 
practice. 
Questions of oppositional cultural production (to the extent that analytic discourse is 
not itself recognised as ‘production’) may seem tangential to CDA, given that ‘A’ is for 
analysis.  But a key question remains: how far can ‘analysis’ with respect to discourse be a 
political force, beyond (currently embattled) reflective aspirations within education, if 
practised separately either from specific social institutions with which it engages towards 
explicitly-formulated political objectives, or from the practical production of new kinds of 
discourse which will circulate in the public domain? 
 
Legitimate Inference: background of a work-in-progress 
 
In the rest of this paper, I describe briefly a project on which I am currently engaged. But my 
description is not offered as a solution to the difficulties I have outlined; in fact my research 
enacts many of the problems. There are nevertheless two features of my work which illustrate 
points I wish to make. First, since I have suggested above that discourse meaning is not 
determined wholly by discourse form, let alone linked determinately by means of discourse 
form to ideology, critical projects appear to need to investigate more vigorously than 
previously the active and varying processes of interpretation undertaken by audiences (2). 
Second, I have also suggested that much of what is most interesting about CDA concerns 
‘meta’ issues, about how social institutions understand and ascribe meanings to discourse; 
projects accordingly appear to need to engage with general frameworks of interpretation as 
much as offering exemplary, oppositional readings of specific texts. My present work tackles 
both these issues. 
 I will call my current study Legitimate Inference here, since it is directed towards a 
book that is likely to be published under that name. It explores what I call ‘meaning trouble-
spots’: contestations of meaning in some of the main areas of media law and regulation, 
including defamation; advertising standards and trade descriptions; obscenity and blasphemy; 
and intellectual property law. The case studies which make up most of the book investigate 
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how socially variant interpretations, often prompted by the combination of discourse with 
different bodies of cultural assumptions (what are usually described in discourse analysis as 
schemas, frames and scripts, for exposition see Greene, 1986)  is reduced in media law to 
legally authoritative attributions of meaning which form the basis of binding judgements. 
Towards a practical outcome, I assess how far empirical research into interpretive variation, 
within linguistic, psychological and ethnographic paradigms, can illuminate particular 
judgements about meaning which are made by the courts and regulatory authorities, and in 
doing so seek to contribute to current public debate over what forms media regulation should 
take.  
Several aspects of the project, I believe, expose interesting problems surrounding 
CDA’s prospects for social engagement. Even the history of the work may be relevant, in that 
my research questions would never have arisen at all as part of an established academic field 
or research agenda;  the study was prompted by completely fortuitous involvement as an 
expert witness in a libel action in 1992 (later written up in Forensic Linguistics, Durant 
1996.)  At the time, my interest had no particular ‘critical’ edge: the intellectual challenge of 
‘proving a meaning’, by means of precise textual, qualitative and quantitative methods, which 
seemed in any case intuitively beyond doubt, had sufficient scholarly attraction. It did surprise 
me to find myself offering an opinion in favour of a libel plaintiff: acting for the wrong side, 
if you take into account the social context of libel as largely a ‘chilling effect’ and a means by 
which the powerful protect reputation as a commercial asset (Barendt et al 1997; Scott-
Bayfield, 1996). But the meaning complained of by the plaintiff (even if a prominent 
businessman...) seemed unassailable; and a defence simply that the expression could not 
reasonably bear the meaning alleged (even if entered on behalf of investigative journalists...) 
appeared at best misjudged.  
As is clear from this description, my proto-project was in a field which would now be 
called forensic linguistics, albeit in the least prestigious and most precarious area of that field: 
concern with meaning (3). The project only ever grew from those beginnings at all because of 
what I consider difficulties with how libel law seeks to account for interpretation (for 
description, see Duncan and Neill, 1983; Robertson and Nichol, 1992); and at this point a 
watershed becomes evident between a ‘forensic linguistics’ approach and a CDA-type 
approach. In forensic linguistics, the linguist simply unpacks her or his specialist tool-kit on 
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demand, in written evidence or in the witness box, leaving broader issues of legal procedure 
to lawyers. In a CDA-type approach, the linguist would offer an opinion within constraints 
determined by current legal procedure, but would seek beyond that to provide context and 
analysis based on different (sometimes polemical) professional insights. 
But how can such dialogue take place, within a social institution so precisely 
governed by rules and authority as the law?  A brief internship (or ‘mini-pupillage’) at a 
specialist libel chambers in London has recently presented me very directly with the core 
problem of establishing professional exchange (in this case with barristers) which avoids 
three obvious pitfalls: the hubris of advising reform to a profession whose technical details I 
began by knowing very little about; the uncritical opportunism of offering expertise on 
consultancy terms, for use by others  - at least in the few cases where they might want to use 
it - for very different professional purposes; or the political fatuousness of translating legal 
concepts and problems into linguistic terminology in order to criticise them for an academic, 
non-legal readership. 
Investigating ‘meaning trouble-spots’ fits uneasily into the most recognised models of 
CDA. It is concerned with how audiences ascribe meanings in given social situations, and 
how social institutions legitimise their own interpretations, rather than with how discourse 
form constructs subject-positions for readers. Its questions are ‘meta’ questions: about 
discourse comprehension; about validity and variation in interpretation; and about how even 
simple meanings might be attributed a balance of accountability (as between speaker and 
reader) and relative likelihood (as between different sorts of readership). But a project along 
these lines cannot be described unproblematically as ‘linguistics applied’ either, since 
linguistics has little prestige and still less credibility in the professional domain in question. 
Rather, what I am attempting is to formulate ways of talking about meaning which - without 
trivialising the problems - lie somewhere between three differing discourse practices: 
valuable academic discourse about meaning, especially in linguistics and psychology; the 
professional discourse of lawyers and media regulators; and the ‘ordinary language’ approach 
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CDA and media regulation 
 
The larger interest of these questions - and the direction my work is now pursuing - is that the 
sorts of issues which arise in libel (eg. around the ‘ordinary reader’ and ‘innuendo meanings’) 
are symptomatic of difficulties with tests of meaning across the full spread of media law. In 
general in media law, legal hermeneutics restricts what a meaning can be to a narrowly-
specified set of effects. Words convey meaning only to the extent that they serve as 
instruments of legally definable effects or purposes, such as imputing misconduct, inciting 
specified actions, or causing pecuniary loss. Other aspects of meaning are considered, for the 
purposes of the law, simply irrelevant.  
But relations between language and law are more complicated than such definition 
and exclusion allow. Language presents law with not one but at least four different types of 
concern, which often become confusingly entangled (Gibbons, 1995). First, there is the 
established jurisprudential view: legal language is not so much ordinary language selectively 
drawn on as an almost algebraic formalism marked off from ordinary language by careful 
procedures of construction of distinct technical terms (‘malice’, ‘recklessness’, etc); such 
construction is  performed by lawyers for their own, clearly-delineated professional purposes. 
That view has been contested, however, by a virtually opposite account proposed in critical 
legal studies: law as an institution consists largely of discourse (both in its reliance on textual 
exegesis and in its rhetorical procedures of pleas and writs, injunctions and acquittals, and so 
on); what follows for critical legal studies is that, since legal discourse involves kinds of 
rhetoric, law as a whole is susceptible to theoretical critiques and deconstruction of its 
rhetorical form (Goodrich, 1987). A third consideration is that, in media law, legal terms are 
used to delineate concepts which specifically address questions of discourse interpretation; so 
legal discussion about the circulation of meanings operates with a technical vocabulary that 
clashes directly with understandings developed in the relevant academic fields. And fourthly, 
routinely in media law articles and utterances consisting of non-legal, social discourse come 
before the courts  because they have been complained about; in these cases, lawyers and 
judges decide the meaning not of their own, technical legal terms but of usage as they 
imagine it functions in the world beyond the courts. 
In the analysis of contested interpretations in media law, it is the fourth type of 
concern with language, the investigation of non-legal, social usage, which is in question 
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(though any discussion along such lines has to invoke concepts of the third type, legal notions 
about meaning and its circulation). Scope for dialogue between lawyers and linguists exists in 
part because for lawyers the fourth type is commonly approached not only by means of 
concepts of the third type, but along lines developed for the second type: that is to say, where 
systematic attention to meaning is paid at all, procedures and standards devised for the 
construction of legal statute are put to work in interpreting utterances in broad social usage 
which simply happen to be made temporary objects of legal adjudication.  
In the absence of dialogue between legal and academic approaches to meaning, claims 
and counter-claims are made in media law and in complaints to regulatory authorities on the 
basis of selective (and sometimes quite erratic) engagement with interpretive problems. Such 
problems include those posed by intention, actual and anticipated effect, paraphrase, and the 
interpretation of figurative language, including irony. Cutting across these problems, there is 
also sometimes a more general confusion, between an expression’s or text’s potential to mean 
something on the basis of linguistic or pictorial conventions (assumed to be part of a 
speaker’s acquired competence as a language user or viewer) and specific acts of 
comprehension in a given situation which rely on inferences triggered against the background 
of each interpreter’s cultural assumptions, so producing significant interpretive variation.  
Difficulties with existing ways of conceiving meaning are especially likely to arise if 
the contested utterance needs to be understood against a changing backdrop of socially or 
regionally varied (and in some areas of vocabulary, rapidly changing) patterns of use, where 
knowledge about likely audience is essential. In such circumstances, it seems at least arguable 
that many of the tests we currently have in Britain (such as the ‘ordinary and natural 
signification’ of an expression in defamation; the ‘tendency to deprave and corrupt’ test in 
obscenity; ‘unjust and unfair’, ‘likely to incite...’, ‘likely to cause grave or widespread 
offence’, and equivalent tests in other areas (see Robertson & Nichol, 1992)) fall short of 
what is required. One reason for this is that current interpretive tests typically invoke the 
idealised ‘reasonableness’ of a notionally homogeneous interpretive community, and appeal 
to bodies of common knowledge and commonsense even as they are obliged to acknowledge 
quite fundamental, actual interpretive variation.  
An alternative view is that for many, perhaps most, contested utterances there will 
exist an uneven, sometimes complex, social distribution of relevant but varying 
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interpretations. If arbitration between conflicting alleged meanings is to be achieved, then a 
means of evaluating interpretations must be found which recognises complex and changing 
networks of social belief and values. Such a procedure needs to allocate responsibility for the 
production of meanings on the basis of how they are arrived at (by means of different sorts of 
implicatures and use of background assumptions, etc). Understanding how meanings are 
implied and understood, and being able to collect and report data to that effect, is clearly 
essential for that task, even if such understanding needs to be presented in everyday terms and 
concepts if it is to be significantly less opaque than much present legal advocacy. 
 The existence of interpretive variation is accepted in media law, of course. But it is 
generally viewed in that context either as a problem to be resolved by determining a single, 
legally authoritative interpretation or as irrelevant diversity around a core of deeper, or even 
universal, moral values. The central argument I seek to develop, by contrast, is that - certainly 
in many and perhaps in all cases - conflicting interpretations cannot be reduced convincingly 
to judgements against general criteria of truth, ordinariness, or reasonableness. But at the 
same time - against the emphasis of deconstruction and postmodernism - if practical 
resolution or arbitration is to be achieved, then searching for the grounds of specific 
interpretations cannot be dismissed as merely facile misunderstanding of the cultural 
relativity or indeterminacy of meaning, as if to give up on decisive authority for meaning is to 
fall straight into scepticism and inaction (for discussion, see Norris, 1997a; 1997b).  
The detailed case studies to be presented in a book with the working title of  
Legitimate Inference aim to illustrate that present regulatory procedures could be helped in 
relevant cases by two shifts of emphasis. Both depend on a significant broadening of the 
accepted legal treatment of interpretive variation. First, appeals to fixed standards of validity 
should be redirected towards more pragmatic notions of what might be called the relative 
legitimacy of  interpretive claims put forward with respect to any given set of circumstances. 
Second, the relative legitimacy of interpretive claims should be established, where disputed, 
on the basis of  tests including, though not restricted to, empirical investigation of what 
parallel uses of contested expressions or images may mean in analogous contexts, as well as 
what the contested utterance or text itself might be established to mean to audiences outside 
the immediate legal process.  
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Conclusions 
 
How would the sort of work I have described - in which the will should not be taken for the 
deed - contribute to the larger project of CDA? That is the question I wish finally to address. 
Understanding our modern media environment means understanding several different 
sorts of things besides discourse forms: first, changing technologies (or means of 
representation and mass communication); second, changing media institutions (including 
producer institutions; distributors and exhibitors; reviewing and promotional organisations, 
etc.); third, the composition of audiences, and their role in formations of consumption trends, 
taste, and notions of value; and fourth, changing legal frameworks for regulation. Developing 
a view about any given aspect of such a media environment - whether as a would-be 
producer, a viewing citizen, or a political radical - depends on forming an overall 
understanding of the complex relations between these agencies: so media study of one kind or 
another is likely to be essential.  
As regards media regulation in particular, libel, copyright and other areas of media 
law express important social relations. They form a key intersection between apparently 
intangible meanings and specific forms of property (in which ideas or reputation become 
assets, constituting rights and allowing legal remedies); and in doing so they also link what 
we think of as the realm of ideas and that of social action, within which property rights and 
relations circulate. Regulation of verbal and other representational practices bridges the 
conception of language as representation and the effects of language as social action. 
 To the extent that CDA makes value-systems implicit in a discourse visible and 
available for conscious scrutiny, it can make a valuable contribution to media education by 
helping readers and viewers articulate interpretive intuitions, and anchors the reading of 
words within readings of the world. Acknowledging the social constructed-ness, and so socio-
cultural character, of assumptions mobilised in inferential procedures of discourse 
interpretation represents a valuable sharpening of the project of close reading and cultural 
reflection sketched out in a tradition of critical analysis traceable from the writings of 
I.A.Richards onwards (but damaged in Richards’s own early formulations by his lack of 
political focus, as Raymond Williams’s concise commentary has shown, Williams, 1957:239-
46). 
A puzzling feature of CDA to date, however, has been that, having suggested that 
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discourse is a social agent, it then often jumps directly from a level of individual readings to 
the macro-level of ideology and generalised power. In between these levels exists not only the 
constraints of discourse practice, in Fairclough’s terms, but also an explicit regulatory 
environment determining what can and cannot be legitimately said, or read, or viewed. Any 
such a framework is in principle politically accountable; CDA should accordingly seek to 
relate its readings to the ethics and politics of regulatory mechanisms which govern 
competition within the representational field as a whole.  
Despite a focus on such topics, however, the prospects for my own work are not 
particularly good. Claims for admitting discourse evidence in media regulation are easily 
dismissed as self-interested lobbying by linguists in a climate of reduced public funding, and 
their expertise caricatured as ‘super-dictionary’ and ‘opinion-poll’ scholasticism which is 
irrelevant to day-to-day conflict arbitration. Legal practitioners generally maintain in any case 
that there are three major structural reasons for not taking linguistic evidence very seriously. 
First, legal adjudications are based, as has already been indicated, on very precisely 
constrained notions of what meaning is ‘for the purpose of the law’. Second, presenting 
research into meaning is likely to be counter-productive, where perceived as an affront to the 
authority of the presiding judge or regulatory committee, or - begging deep questions about 
legal process -  a jury’s prerogative, as a simple, quasi-representative group of peers, of 
reaching decisions unencumbered by prejudicial ‘expert’ evidence.  Third, decisions as to the 
meaning of utterances or texts are usually just one local crux - a sub-plot, rather than the 
entire narrative - of legal actions or complaints in which they occur; legal protagonists almost 
invariably place far greater emphasis on tactics, investigation of background circumstances, 
and likely financial consequences. 
 It is as much one consequence as the substance of this situation which is worrying. 
What follows implicitly is that the only people properly qualified to comment on legal 
skirmishes over meaning are lawyers themselves (with the danger of this position amplified 
by the fact that reliance on any one particular interpretation in a jury verdict, within a 
complex overall case, is rarely if ever disclosed). The more general consequence of this 
situation for CDA, I believe, is that where linguistics seeks to contribute to legal argument, it 
must do so not on the basis of presumed superiority regarding its own expertise concerning 
how discourse works. Instead, it needs to piece together publicly assessable evidence about 
  19 
variant interpretations and their relative likelihood and legitimacy, and set this for comparison 
alongside current legal tests and arguments. If there is a general lesson for CDA in this lower-
key approach it is this. For CDA projects to have credible prospects of social engagement 
which is neither preaching to the converted nor dependent on the power relations of the 
seminar room, they will need to work closely and in a sustained, continuous way (as a number 
of projects have and do) with mainstream social institutions, despite often very different 




(1) Norman Fairclough has offered useful critical self-commentary in a series of 
retrospective section introductions (Fairclough, 1995), though these tend to focus 
more on matters of argument than on the social functioning of CDA. Other writers 
also comment, but often only briefly and in passing. 
 
(2) Research into audiences has followed a number of different research traditions. See, 
for instance, Ang (1991), Morley (1992), Kent (1994), and, for a collection concerned 
with possibilities for convergence between the different traditions, Hay et al (1996). 
Each of the traditions is nevertheless perplexed by questions of meaning.  
 
(3) While there is forensic expertise in bloodstains and firearms, the court sees itself as 
the expert on language. Even so, two kinds of linguistic evidence are occasionally 
admissible: (a) evidence as to authorship (a kind of traditional identification 
evidence); (b) evidence as to meaning (traditionally a role for juries, or for a judge 
hearing applications in chambers). Within linguistics, there is then an implicit scale of 
relative authority: phonetics is considered to offer firmest, or most scientific evidence; 
stylistic evidence (eg. as regards authorship or the authenticity of disputed documents) 
is widely viewed as speculative; meaning evidence is regarded with scepticism, as 
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